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I. INTRODUCTION
Effective January 1, 1993, the Florida Legislature revised the law in
Florida relating to negotiable instruments by replacing former Florida
Statutes, chapter 673,' with a new chapter 673 of the Florida Statutes,
* Solo Practitioner whose practice concentrates in the area of banking and commercial
law in St. Petersburg, Florida. B.S. from the University of Florida, a J.D. from Stetson
University College of Law, and an LL.M. in Banking Law Studies from Boston University
School of Law. Portions of this article were published in the November 1993 FLORIDA BAR
JOURNAL.
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 673.101-673.805 (1991) (formerly entitled "Uniform Commercial
Code: Commercial Paper") (generally referred to as the "former" law).
1
Golden: Negotiable Instruments (U.C.C. Articles 3 & 4)
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
entitled "Negotiable Instruments."2 Revised chapter 673 incorporates re-
vised Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code within the Florida
Statutes. Further, the law also amended, renumbered, and repealed parts
of former chapter 674 of the Florida Statutes pertaining to bank deposits and
collections ("amended chapter 674"), 4 as well as various other Florida
Uniform Commercial Code sections. Because the revisions apply to
transactions entered on or after January 1, 1993, no Florida appellate court
as of the time this article was submitted had interpreted the revisions.
Moreover, there were no amendments to the revised chapters during the
1993 Florida Legislative Session.
II. BACKGROUND
The revisions to the Uniform Commercial Code were originally
promulgated by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1990 for adoption by the various
states to modernize the law of negotiable instruments. The American Bar
Association, as well as twenty-three states, including Florida, had approved
the revisions by August 1993.6
Former Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code on commercial
paper and former Article 4 on bank deposits and collections were both
drafted in the early 1950s, and were written largely for a paper-based
system. These former sections were essentially a revision of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law. In turn, the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law was based primarily upon the British Bill of Exchange Act of 1882,
which was a codification of case law from the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Thus, former Articles 3 and 4 were very old law in substance,
and were created when business transactions were fewer in number and
often conducted on a face-to-face basis. No major revisions of either
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 673.101-673.805 (Supp. 1992) (repealed existing sections and created
new sections within, designated parts to, and retitled Florida Statutes, chapter 673).
3. Id.
4. Id. §§ 674.101-674.504; chapter 674 incorporates Revised Article 4 of the Uniform
Commercial Code within the Florida Statutes.
5. U.C.C. § 3 (1990).
6. States that have enacted the Article 3 and 4 Uniform Commercial Code Revisions as
of the date this article was submitted include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri,
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articles have been undertaken since their inceptions. Changes in technology,
in business and financial practices, in federal responses to the consumer
protection movement, and in interpretive ambiguities in the various sections
of the existing law have created difficulties in the application of the original
code. The revisions do not radically change the basic rules of negotiable
instruments law contained in former Articles 3 and 4, but do modify that
law in several significant respects. The revisions attempt to make the
substance of both Article 3 and 4 more relevant to the way in which
business is done today.
For example, former chapter 674 was prepared at the beginning of the
automated processing for the collection of checks. As a result, banks and
other institutions faced many problems that did not have clear answers under
Florida law. An example is the Magnetic Ink Character Recognition
("MICR") process which is now in universal use. In this process, a check's
face amount is magnetically encoded so that it can be "read" by a computer.
Often, banks were precluded from recovery if they made an error in the
encoding processing. Revised chapter 674 accommodates the realities of the
automated processing system to provide for encoding warranties to give
banks a basis for recovery, and takes into account check truncation 7 in its
scheme for distributing rights and liabilities.
The revisions also attempt to clarify the language and rules by
removing ambiguous and confusing language found in former Article 3. An
example is the deletion of the phrase "with whom the holder has not dealt"
in section 673.3051(2) of the Florida Statutes which states the defenses of
any party to the instrument from which a holder in due course took free.8
Federal law, in some instances, preempts revised chapter 674 of the
Florida Statutes. For example, the Competitive Equality Banking Act of
1987,9 and Regulation CC,"0 control all aspects of the check collection
system and supersede many state law check collection provisions.
7. Check truncation refers to the process of check collection whereby items are not
physically returned to the payor bank from the collecting bank.
8. FLA. STAT. § 673.3051(2) (Supp. 1992).
9. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 60, 101 Stat. 552,
635 (1987) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 4007 (1988)).
10. Regulation CC of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, located
at 12 C.F.R. § 229 (1990), implements the Expedited Funds Availability Act. The Expedited
Funds Availability Act was passed by Congress in 1987 and is designed to limit the hold
periods depositary banks can impose on customer accounts with respect to checks deposited
in those accounts and grants the Federal Reserve Board extensive regulatory powers over any
aspect of the payment system. See FLA. STAT. § 673.3051(2) (Supp. 1992).
1993]
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This article addresses the revisions' impact on Florida law, and briefly
discusses various details of their provisions and underlying policy.
III. SCOPE AND COVERAGE OF REVISIONS
Both former and revised chapter 673 cover negotiable instruments. The
former chapter had no provision stating its scope, while revised chapter 673
affirmatively states that it applies to "negotiable instruments."'" Although
they have many forms, there are only two types of negotiable instruments:
drafts, 2 which include checks, and notes, 3 which include certificates of
deposit. 4 One of the aims that the drafters hoped to accomplish was to
recognize that notes and drafts have different functions meriting different
treatment.
Nearly all of the instruments that were negotiable remain negotiable
under revised chapter 673, thus allowing the transferee of the negotiable
instrument to become a holder in due course.' 5 However, a few items that
were not neg6tiable under the former chapter will become so under the
11. FLA. STAT. § 673.1021(1) (Supp. 1992). The chief effect of an instrument being
negotiable is that one who takes such paper for value, in good faith, and without notice that
it is overdue, or contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered or that there is a claim
or defense, becomes the owner of the paper free of the defenses and equities that exist
between the original parties to the contract.
12. Id. § 673.1041(5). Comment 4 of this section provides that a "draft is an instrument
that is an order." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.1041 cmt. 4 (West Supp. 1993). An "order" is
defined in section 673.1031(1)(f) (Supp. 1992).
13. FLA. STAT. § 673.1041(5) (Supp. 1992). Comment 4 of this section provides that
"a note is an instrument that is a promise." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.1041 cmt. 4 (West Supp.
1993). The statute also defines the term "promise." FLA. STAT. § 673.1031(1)(i) (Supp.
1992).
14. FLA. STAT. § 673.1041(10) (Supp. 1992).
15. Id. § 673.3021. To become a holder in due course under section 673.3021 a party
must meet a two-pronged requirement. First, an instrument, when issued or negotiated to the
holder, must not bear such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration or is not otherwise so
irregular or incomplete so as to call it into question. Second, the holder must take the
instrument for value, in good faith, and without notice of four matters: (a) that the
instrument is overdue or has been dishonored or that there is an uncured default with respect
to payment of another instrument issued as part of the same series; (b) that the instrument
contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered; (c) of any claim to the instrument
described in section 673.3061 (which includes a right to rescind a negotiation); and (4) that
any party has a defense or claim in recoupment described in section 673.3051(1). Id. A
holder in due course is a super-plaintiff who takes the negotiable instrument free of most of
the ordinary contract defenses and claims to that instrument. See id.
[Vol. 18
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 17
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/17
Golden
revision. In recent years, lenders have used notes containing variable
interest rates to evidence their loans. Courts have held that these notes are
not negotiable instruments because such notes are not considered to contain
an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain, which is required in order
for former chapter 673 to apply. 6 As a result, banks and other holders of
such instruments discovered that they could be subject to defenses to
payment arising out of the transaction that generated the note, and about
which the bank may know little. The revised section rejects this approach
and allows variable interest rate notes to be considered promises to pay a
sum certain and therefore negotiable. 7 Under revised chapter 673 the
requirement of a "fixed amount of money" applies only to the principal
amount.18
Under the former law, if a check lacked words of negotiability such as
"order" or "bearer," there could be no holder in due course. Under the
revision, the definition of a check deletes the provisions that it must be
payable to "bearer" or to "order" and thus checks that omit words of
negotiability are treated as fully negotiable.' 9 The rationale for this change
is that it is good policy to treat checks, which are payment instruments, as
negotiable instruments whether or not they contain words of negotiability,
especially since these words are almost always preprinted on the check
form.2" All other instruments, however, require words of negotiability.
Ordinary money orders now are classified in the revision as checks
rather than bank obligations, so as to preserve the right to stop payment if
the instrument is lost or there is a problem in the transaction.2 Therefore,
in Florida, ordinary money orders are subject to dishonor, overruling Unger
v. NCNB National Bank.22 Further, revised Florida Statutes, section
673.4111 improves the acceptability of bank obligations like cashier's
checks and teller's checks23 as cash equivalents by discouraging wrongful
dishonor of these items. Subsection three provides that if an obligated bank
wrongfully refuses to pay, it may be liable for consequential damages.24
16. Doyle v. Trinity Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 869 F.2d 558 (10th Cir. 1989).
17. FLA. STAT. §§ 673.1121, 673.1041 (Supp. 1992).
18. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.1121(1) cmt. 1. (West Supp. 1993).
19. FLA. STAT. § 673.1041(4) (Supp. 1992).
20. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.1041(2) cmt. 2. (West Supp. 1993).
21. FLA. STAT. § 673.1041(6) (Supp. 1992).
22. 540 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (money orders are akin to
cashier's checks and not subject to dishonor).
23. Section 673.1041(8), Florida Statutes defines a "teller's check" as a draft drawn by
a bank and is usually drawn on another bank. FLA. STAT. § 673.1041(8) (Supp. 1992).
24. Id. § 673.4111(3).
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One of the most important changes from existing law under revised
section 673.1041 is that all non-negotiable instruments (other than checks)
are excluded from chapter 673.25 Thus, a promise or order (other than a
check) which includes a conspicuous statement that it is not negotiable or
is not covered by chapter 673 will be excluded from this chapter. However,
the official comments to revised section 673.1041 provide that parties to an
instrument that are not included in chapter 673 may agree to apply its rules
to their contract.26
A. Definitional Changes
The revisions make several significant changes in definitions. The first
is "good faith." Under former law, "good faith" was defined as "honesty
in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. 27 Revised chapter 673
redefines it, for both chapters 673 and 674 purposes, to include both honesty
in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing. 28 The latter phrase refers to the fairness of conduct, not the care
with which an act is performed. 29 Thus, the so-called pure heart, empty
head test doctrine is displaced. The change brings the chapter 673 definition
in accord with the prevailing standard under chapter 672-Sales with respect
to merchants, which prevails in Article 2A-Leases, and which has been
incorporated in Article 4A-Funds Transfers. The drafters provide no
guidance for interpreting fairness of conduct or what might constitute
reasonable commercial standards.
The definition of "ordinary care" is another change in the revisions.
It is defined in amended chapter 674, without substantive change from
former chapter 674, and is further defined in revised chapter 673 (and
applicable to amended chapter 674) to mean
in the case of a person engaged in business, . . . observance of
reasonable commercial standards, prevailing in the area in which the
person is located, with respect to the business in which the person is
engaged. In the case of a bank that takes an instrument for processing
for collection or payment by automated means, reasonable commercial
standards do not require the bank to examine the instrument if the
failure to examine does not violate the bank's prescribed procedures and
25. Id. § 673.102(1).
26. FLA. STAT. § 673.1041 cmt. 2 (West Supp. 1993).
27. FLA. STAT. § 671.201(19) (1991).
28. FLA. STAT. §§ 673.1031(l)(d), 674.104(3) (Supp. 1992).
29. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.1031 cmt. 4. (West Supp. 1993).
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the bank's procedures do not vary unreasonably from general banking
usage not disapproved by this chapter or chapter 674.30
The latter phrase attempts to facilitate the automated processing of checks
on a risk/benefit analysis, that is, it does not require signature review until
the point at or just before which it is economically prudent to do so.
Further, the revisions make the issue of ordinary care one of fact.
The definition of "bank" for purposes of chapters 673 and 674 is
expanded to include savings banks, savings and loans associations, credit
unions, and trust companies. 3' The question of whether an institution is
or is not a "bank" is an important one because it determines whether the
institution is subject to the provisions of chapter 674. The aforementioned
institutions had been omitted from the definition of a bank in the past
because they had not been permitted to offer checking services and thus did
not qualify under state or federal banking law as a bank. However, as a
consequence of recent federal legislation, savings and loan associations, and
other institutions are now engaged in the check collection process much like
traditional banks. Moreover, with this new expanded definition of "bank,"
chapter 674 now conforms to Regulation CC 3" which includes these
institutions within the definition of banks.
IV. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
Accord and satisfaction deals with an informal method of dispute
resolution carried out by use of a negotiable instrument. In the typical case,
there is a dispute concerning the amount that is owed on a claim. For
example, if the drawer 33 includes a legend on an instrument stating that
payment of the check constitutes full satisfaction of the underlying
obligation, the payee 34 runs the risk that the drawer's obligation will be
satisfied if it voluntarily cashes or presents the check and is paid. Many
payees attempted to legend their indorsement with the words "reservation of
rights" or "under protest" or "without prejudice" in an effort to counter the
30. FLA. STAT. § 673.1031(g) (Supp. 1992).
31. Id. §§ 673.1031(3), 674.104(2), 674.105(1); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.1031 cmt. 4
(West Supp. 1993).
32. 12 C.F.R. § 229.2(E)(4), (5) (Supp. 1990).
33. A drawer is defined in section 673.1031(l)(c), as "a person who signs or is
identified in a draft as a person ordering payment." FLA. STAT. § 673.1031(1)(c) (Supp.
1992).
34. The payee is the person to whom a draft or note is made payable.
1993]
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drawer's "full payment" legend. Because the former law did not include
specific language concerning accord and satisfaction, there was an enormous
amount of confusion and litigation regarding the "full payment" checks.
Many courts relied on the common law to hold that if the payee cashed the
check, the consumer's obligation was satisfied. However, some courts have
held that the language of former UCC section 1-207 supports the payee's
argument that the debt was not discharged if the payee indicated he or she
had taken the instrument under protest. Florida courts were split on this
issue.35 Now, the revisions clarify the rules pertaining to accord and
satisfaction.
First, as part of the revision of chapter 673, revised section 671.207 has
been amended to add subsection two which provides that section 671.207
"does not apply to an accord and satisfaction. 36 Second, the revisions add
a section entitled "Accord and satisfaction by use of instrument."3 This
section contains provisions concerning satisfaction of disputed claims
through tendering of "instruments." It sets out the specific requirements that
must be met for payment of an instrument to constitute accord and
satisfaction.3" Thus, if the person seeking the accord and satisfaction
proves that the requirements of subsection (a) are met and the "conspicuous"
statements are given, the claim is discharged unless revised section
673.3111(3) applies. This subsection is intended to address the problems
faced by entities that receive and process a large number of checks.39
Under subsection three such entities can avoid an inadvertent accord and
satisfaction if they both notify the debtor that any full satisfaction check
must be sent to a designated location, and are able to prove the instrument
in question was not sent to that location.
V. SIGNATURES BY AGENTS
Under former law, if an agent failed to sign a note in a manner that
fully disclosed both his representative capacity and the name of his
principal, the agent could personally be liable even though the principal was
not. The former law provided that no person is liable on an instrument
35. See Eder v. Yvette B. Gervey Interiors, Inc., 407 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1981); Miller v. Jung, 361 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
36. FLA. STAT. § 671.207(2) (Supp. 1992).
37. Id. § 673.3111.
38. Id. § 673.3111(l), (2).
39. Id. § 673.3111(3).
[Vol. 18
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unless his or her signature appeared,4" which had been interpreted to mean
that an undisclosed principal was not liable on a negotiable instrument."'
This was an exception to the general principle of agency law that binds an
undisclosed principal on a contract.42 Revised section 673.4021 returns to
general agency principles and states that "the represented person would be
bound if the signature were on a simple contract. '43  However, under
673.4021(2)(b) of this section, both the agent and the principal are liable on
such an instrument to a holder in due course that took the instrument
without notice that the agent was not intended to be liable on the instru-
ment.44
Subsection three, however, changes the law and provides that an agent
who has signed an instrument without adequate indication of representative
status may show that the parties did not intend individual liability. 5 This
rule is not effective against a holder in due course. Moreover, under
subsection three, an authorized representative will not be personally liable,
even if the signature does not indicate agency status as long as the check is
drawn on the corporate account and the corporation is identified on the
check.46 Therefore, in Florida, the agent does not have to disclose his or
her capacity on a preprinted check bearing the principal's name to avoid
liability. Section 673.4031(2) makes it clear that a signature of an
organization is considered unauthorized if more than one signature is
required and a signature is missing.47
VI. ALLOCATION OF Loss
A. Comparative Negligence Standard is Adopted
A major issue in negotiable instruments law is the proper balance
between imposing loss on the employer, drawer or maker, and imposing loss
on third parties, including payor or depositary banks, for theft, forgery, and
unauthorized signatures. Much of the former statute's common theme was
to allocate the loss to the party that was in the best position to avoid the
40. FLA. STAT. § 673.401 (1991).
41. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.4021 cmt. I (West Supp. 1993).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 673.4021(2)(b).
45. Id. § 673.4021(3).
46. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.4021(3) (West Supp. 1993).
47. Id. § 673.4031(2).
1993]
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loss. However, determining which party is in the best position to prevent
the loss was a difficult and uncertain process, especially in complex fact-
sensitive settings. As a result, no provisions of the former law were more
heavily litigated than the fraud allocation rules, particularly with respect to
forged drawer's signatures and forged indorsements. The revisions adopt
a balancing rationale to allocating loss. All parties in the payment and
collection process have a responsibility to exercise ordinary care. Failure
by any party to fulfill that responsibility should result in that party bearing
an appropriate share of the resulting loss. For instance, under the former
code, a payor bank, which in good faith paid a forged check, could shift the
loss to the customer if the customer's "negligence" substantially contributed
to the forgery, unless the bank was contributorily negligent.4"
The prior negligence preclusion rule, now phrased in terms of failure
to exercise ordinary care, is continued in revised section 673.4061(1).
However, contrary to the prior rule stated above, the negligence of a bank
will not prevent it from asserting the negligence of the customer that
substantially contributed to a forged signature or to an alteration. In the
case where both the bank's customer and the bank are negligent, the loss
will be allocated proportionately according to the degree of failure of each
to exercise ordinary care.49 The intent of the drafters in moving to this
comparative fault is that it will reduce litigation and settlements will be
encouraged by parties who realize that the jury may find both the customer
and bank are both to blame in allowing the malefactor to succeed in his or
her wrongdoing.
B. Fraudulent Indorsements Made by Employees
Another policy issue that was unclear under the former statute is the
extent to which an employer, rather than a depositary or payor bank, should
bear the loss caused by a dishonest employee who misappropriates
negotiable instruments payable to, or drawn by, the employer. The revision
imposes more responsibility on the employer for employee wrongdoing than
former chapter 673. Former section 673.405 dealt only with certain limited
frauds practiced by dishonest employees of drawers. The former section did
not specifically address a situation where the malefactor is an employee not
of the drawer but instead, is employed by the payee.5" Fraudulent indorse-
ments by an employee of the payee are now effective under the revisions
48. FLA. STAT. § 673.406 (1991).
49. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.4061(2) (West Supp. 1993).
50. FLA. STAT. § 673.405 (1991).
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against the payee as long as the employee had the requisite responsibility
with respect to the instrument. Revised section 673.4051, titled "Employer's
responsibility for fraudulent indorsement by employee," adopts the principle
that the risk of loss for "responsible" employee fraud in connection with the
employer's checks should fall on the employer, because "the employer is in
a far better position to avoid the loss by care in choosing employees, in
supervising them, and in adopting other measures to prevent forged
endorsement on instruments payable to the employer or fraud in the issuance
of instruments in the name of the employer."'
Under this new statute, the loss is shifted to employers by making the
endorsement of the employer's name effective if made by an employee
"entrusted . . . with responsibility with respect to the instrument."'52 The
term "responsibility" is defined to include the authority to sign or indorse
instruments, to process instruments received, to process or prepare
instruments to be issued, to supply names or address of payees, to control
the disposition of instruments or to act in a responsible capacity.53 Thus,
if an employee, who has authority to process incoming checks for bookkeep-
ing purposes, steals a check, forges his or her employer's endorsement, and
absconds with the proceeds, the employer is per se negligent and assigned
the loss because it has been defrauded by a "responsible employee."
However, the revised statute allows the employer to "shift the loss to the
bank" to the extent the bank's failure to use ordinary care contributed to the
loss. 4
C. Direct Suits on Forged Indorsements
Revised section 673.4201 clarifies several issues with respect to a
forged indorsement. Under the former law, the owner of a check was
denied the right to hold a depositary bank liable for conversion when it
collected a check with a forged indorsement and paid the proceeds to a
person not entitled to them.55 The revised section changes the law in this
area by permitting the owner of an instrument to proceed in a direct action
against either the depositary or payor bank on a forged indorsement.56
Thus, this section eliminates the requirement that the owner of the check
51. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.4051 cmt. I. (West Supp. 1993).
52. FLA. STAT. § 673.4051(2) (Supp. 1992).
53. Id. § 673.4051(1)(c).
54. Id. § 673.4051(2).
55. FLA. STAT. § 673.419 (1991); Knesz v. Central Jersey Bank & Trust Co., 477 A.2d
806 (N.J. 1984).
56. FLA. STAT. § 673.4201 (Supp. 1992).
1993]
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bring multiple actions against the various payor banks and that those banks
then assert warranty rights against the depositary bank.57
However, a depositary bank is not subject to a direct suit by a drawer
on a forged indorsement. Under former law the courts were divided on
whether the drawer of a check with a forged indorsement could assert rights
against a depositary bank that took the check." Revised section 673.4201
(])(a) resolves the conflict by providing that the drawer of a check cannot
sue the depositary bank in conversion, since the check represents the
obligation of the drawer rather than the drawer's property.59 The drawer
retains its remedy against the payor bank for recredit of the drawer's
account based on unauthorized payment.60
Moreover, the revised section clarifies the rights of the payee in a
situation in which a thief steals or obtains possession of an instrument in an
unauthorized manner and forges the payee's indorsement so the thief can
obtain payment at a depositary or drawee bank.6' Section 673.4201(1)(b)
provides that a payee who did not receive either direct delivery of the
instrument or indirect delivery through an agent or co-payee may not bring
an action for conversion. The rationale behind this is that until the payee
has possession of the instrument, the instrument does not belong to the
payee such that a conversion action is proper.61
VII. CUSTOMER'S DUTY TO DISCOVER UNAUTHORIZED
SIGNATURE OR ALTERATION
Revised section 674.406 extends duties to customers to examine their
bank statements and to promptly report reasonably discoverable unauthorized
signatures or alterations.63 Under former section 674.406, a bank normally
sent its customers the statement of account accompanied by a paid or
canceled check.64  After the bank made the statement and the checks
available, the customers had a duty to discover any unauthorized signature
57. See id.
58. Compare Jett v. Lewis State Bank, 277 So. 2d 37 (Fla. ist Dist. Ct. App. 1973)
(drawer has no basis for suit) with Wymore State Bank v. Johnson Int'l Co., 873 F.2d 1082
(8th Cir. 1989) (drawer may sue).
59. See FLA. STAT. § 673.4201(1)(a) (Supp. 1992).
60. See id. § 673.4201(3).
61. See id. § 673.4201(1)(b).
62. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.4201 cmt. I. (West Supp. 1993).
63. FLA. STAT. § 674.406(3) (Supp. 1992).
64. See FLA. STAT. § 674.406(l) (1991).
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or alteration and promptly notify the bank of this discovery.6" To facilitate
truncation and the existing state of technology, revised section 674.406
extends to the customer the responsibility to discover alterations and
unauthorized signatures even when the customer only receives the statement
and not the checks.66 However, the statement must contain "sufficient
information" to allow the customer to reasonably identify the items paid.67
"Sufficient information" can be as little as information concerning the item
number, amount, and date of payment.68 Thus, under this revised defini-
tion, a bank is not required to provide the customer with the name of the
payee or the date the check was written. While this rule may appear fair on
its face and may result in reduced processing costs for the bank, consumers
may suffer. Many consumers do not keep meticulous records; if the
consumer receives only the check number, amount, and date of payment, it
may be difficult to determine whether a check has been misdirected to an
improper payee or has been altered.
Revised section 674.406 changes the allocation of loss between the
parties. 69 Under former section 674.406, customers could be held responsi-
ble for an unauthorized signature if they failed to promptly examine the
statement and checks, and such failure to examine and notify caused the
loss.7" Under the former section, the customer would not be responsible if
the customer successfully established that the bank failed to exercise
ordinary care in paying the check.7 Under the revised Florida Uniform
Commercial Code, if the customer fails to promptly notify the bank of
"relevant facts," the customer not only must prove the bank failed to
exercise ordinary care, but he or she also must prove that "the failure
substantially contributed to the loss."72 Even if the customer provides the
necessary proof, the bank may not bear the entire loss because revised
section 674.406(5) provides a comparative negligence test for allocating loss
between the customer and bank.73 However, this subsection also provides
that if the customer proves the bank did not pay the check in good faith, the
65. Id.
66. FLA. STAT. § 674.406(3) (Supp. 1992).
67. Id. § 674.406(1).
68. Id.
69. See id. § 674.406(4), (5).
70. FLA. STAT. § 674.406(2) (1991).
71. Id. § 674.406(3).
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preclusion does not apply, and the customer may demand that the bank
credit his or her account.74
The new definitions of good faith and ordinary care may also prove a
major change in the operation of this section." Under former law, good
faith was defined as "honesty in fact., 76 The definition of "good faith" is
expanded under revised section 673.1031(l)(d) to require both honesty in
fact and "observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.,
77
The official comment to revised section 673.1031 attempts to clarify the
meaning of observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing
by expressing concern for fairness of conduct rather than the care with
which an act is performed.7" One must determine fair dealing "in light of
reasonable commercial standards., 79 The drafters provide no guidance for
interpreting fairness of conduct or what might constitute reasonable
commercial standards. This new definition of good faith, however, should
impose a higher duty upon banks, and should benefit consumers by making
it clear that banks have an obligation to observe objective standards of
fairness and commercial reasonableness in handling consumer accounts.
The term "ordinary care" used in the revision specifically provides that
sight examination by a payor bank is not required if its procedure is
reasonable and is commonly followed by other comparable banks in the
area.8° The official comment states the intent is to reject those cases that
hold failure to use sight reviews constitutes lack of ordinary care as a matter
of law."1 Therefore, this new provision for ordinary care under section
674.406 should benefit banks because the determination of whether a bank
has failed to exercise ordinary care will now be left to the jury who will
measure the bank's conduct against what its peers do in its market area.82
This section also increases the maximum time from fourteen days to thirty
days for a customer to report successive forgeries or alterations.83 Further,
revised section 674.406(2) states a new rule whereby a bank truncating
74. Id. § 674.406(5).
75. Id. § 673.1031(I)(d).
76. See FLA. STAT. § 671.201(19) (1991).
77. FLA. STAT. § 673.1031(I)(d) (Supp. 1992).
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.1031 cmt. 4 (West Supp. 1993).
79. Id.
80. FLA. STAT. § 673.1031(I)(g) (Supp. 1992).
81. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.1031 cmt. 4 (West Supp. 1993).
82. See FLA. STAT. § 674.406 (Supp. 1992).
83. Id. § 674.406(4)(b).
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The amendments to Florida Statutes, chapters 673 and 674 should
lower costs to banks by providing for modem technologies such as check
truncation and automated processing. Further, the amendments should help
provide certainty for the financial community and its users by removing the
numerous ambiguities that existed in the former provisions. Moreover, by
clarification of troublesome issues, and by the provisions of sections
673.4041 to 673.4061, which reform rules for allocation of loss from forger-
ies and alterations, the revisions should reduce litigation. Consumers receive
some added protections and benefits from the revisions, including an
expanded statutory obligation for banks to act in good faith. However,
consumers will now be confronted with extra duties placed on them in
connection with unauthorized signatures or alterations of checks.
84. Id. § 674.406(2).
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